Perelman,+Chaim.++The+New+Rhetoric..+A+Theory+of+Practical+Reasoning

Perelman wants to introduce a “New Rhetoric,” which, in many ways, is more a revival of classical rhetoric than something totally new. However, he argues for a coalescence of the philosophical dialectic and the rhetorical stance of persuasion. We can understand this “new” rhetoric by comparing it to the idea of demonstration, which “is a calculation made in accordance with rules that have made beforehand” (65). Thus, our actions/speech is judged either correct or incorrect in accordance with these rules, and presupposes our acceptance of the rules or axioms to which they are being judged. Argumentation, on the other hand, is always about an orator (where spoken or written) and an audience, and thus the “new” rhetoric is a type of informal logic where the speaker is concerned with “obtaining or maintaining the adherence of an audience” (67). Perelman stresses ethos when he states that good men must be listed to and others prevented [from speaking or being heard], and thus hearkens back to a very hegemonic definition of rhetoric (66). He appeals to ethos again when warding off Plato’s warning that rhetoric is about winning rather than truth – this time by appeal to the audience’s ethos – by claiming that untruthful arguments would not win if presented to a better and better educated audience (69). Through all this, Perelman seeks to demonstrate how philosophers should be interested in the study of rhetoric, both because the ancient rhetoricians have an impact on philosophy, but also because the study of rhetoric will demonstrate how to reach justifiable conclusions without formal logic or syllogism (similar to Toulmin in this way).
 * Perelman, Chaim. “The New Rhetoric: A Theory of Practical Reasoning.”**